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In the decades immediately following the Civil War, the impetus for  
industrialization and technological development which had helped propel the  
Union to victory began to dramatically pick up speed, engendering staggering  
changes in almost every facet of American economic and social. Indeed, by the  
end of the century, such changes had helped precipitate the closing of the  
frontier, the United Stat ajor  
imperialist power, and the rise of the populist movement, which climaxed in the  
great realigning Presidential election of 1896. The last of these was particularly  
significant in that it was arguably the first large-scale attempt to seriously address  
the various problems created by the rapid urbanization and industrialization of 
the late nineteenth century and would moreover serve as the prelude to a much 
larger and more fundamental awakening in American political life, that vast tangle  
of reforms and prescriptions which beggars all generalization, best known to us  
today as the progressive movement. In the quarter century to follow, the three 
greatest leaders of this movement at the national level, William Jennings Bryan, 
Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson each articulated a distinct conception 
of or approach toward reform, inspiring and antagonizing each other in ways 
which significantly shaped both the thought and action of the progressive era. 
This interaction between the three men and the ideas they espoused can be 
 iii 
and paternalistic approach as the antithesis, and Wilson and his New Freedom 
as a sort of synthesis of the two. By more closely examining the careers, public 
statements, and political convictions of these three archetypal figures, we may be 
able to better understand the origin, development, and effects of this political 
dialectic not only within its own time, but throughout the following century, leading 
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THE GILDED AGE CONSENSUS 
 
In his magisterial cultural history of the West in modern times, From Dawn 
to Decadence, Jacques Barzun memorably labeled the era around the turn from 
a term certainly feels à propos when applied to the political and social 
developments of the time in the United States. In less than four generations, the 
United States had grown from a thinly populated, scarcely half-settled republic 
clinging to the Eastern seaboard into one of 
North American continent itself, but, after the imperialistic adventures of William 
McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, over a far-flung empire in the Caribbean and 
Pacific and a de facto but very real hegemony over the hemisphere as a whole. 
Economically and technologically, the changes were even more incredible, as the 
-rate (55 live 
births per thousand of population at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 43.3 
per thousand of population at mid-century, and still as high as 32.3 at the 
beginning of the twentieth century) and more so by the thousands, and 
eventually hundreds of thousands of European immigrants who arrived every 
year (with 425,000 coming in 1900 alone and well over eight million more to 
follow in the ensuing decade) completely upended the cherished Jeffersonian 
efined (though, as Richard 
 2 
Hofstadter later delighted in pointing out, never as simply or as thoroughly as folk 
concomitant and fantastic mushrooming of cities throughout this period is an 
even more compelling testament of encroaching modernity as the nation, which 
had no metropolitan areas of 100,000 or more in 1810, found itself with thirty-
eight such cities ninety years later. 
Arguably the most significant effect associated with the rise of 
industrialization, however, at least at the socio-economic level, was the 
explosive, and, to some Americans, profoundly troubling rise of corporatism in 
almost all aspects of the American economy, and through that eventually, 
virtually all aspects of American life in general. The growth of the modern joint-
stock corporation cannot be separated from the rise of industrial civilization, as 
each facilitated the other so synchronously so as to seem almost like a single 
phenomenon. And yet the common practice of several individuals banding 
relatively new, with the first general incorporation law being passed by New York 
State in 1813, and only becoming widely feasible lega
the Jacksonians picked up on general incorporation laws as one of their central 
economic reforms and pushed for their passage in states around the country. 
However, as Forrest McDonald has pointed out, it was the building of the railway 
 3 
unprec -permanent form of business 
1  More importantly, it provided entrepreneurs with a superb 
instrument to exploit the now truly national economic opportunities opened by 
railroads. Aided by state governments that were cooperative with this drift toward 
incorporation either through sympathy, apathy, or occasionally outright venality 
(or any combination thereof), the corporate system of consolidation swept all 
before it. This tendency reached a climax in a great wave of consolidations 
hundred consolidations took place, totaling $7.5 billion in capitalization and 
2 
However, there was a dilemma implicit in the creation of the new 
corporations that would eventually involve and to a large degree remake national 
politics. While created at the behest of state governments, the largest 
corporations soon developed a truly national reach and influence to a degree 
unprecedented in the history of the American economy. In other words, like the 
became much too large and powerful for them to effectively police or let them to 
control themselves. Clearly only the federal government possessed the requisite 
power to lay down the law to such economic colossi as Andrew Carnegie and J. 
                                                 
1 Forrest McDonald, The United States in the Twentieth Century (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968), 4-5. 
2 John Milton Cooper, Pivotal Decades: The United States, 1900-1920 (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1990), 11. 
 4 
Pierpont Morgan, who between themselves orchestrated the merger creating the 
United States Steel Corporation in 1901, the first business ever initially 
capitalized at $1 billion or more, or John D. Rockefeller of the Standard Oil 
Company, who became the first American to amass a personal fortune of a 
similar size at around the same time. 
For decades following the Civil War, the likes of Carnegie, Rockefeller, 
and Morgan had little to fear from the federal government. In fact, they almost 
came to see the government as a bulwark and an appendage for their own 
purposes. Partly, this was due to a striking overlap in key personnel between 
business and government leadership, a phenomenon that, while hardly new or 
unique to the period, did grow increasingly acute as the Third Party System 
continued. For example, turning again to the railroads, of the seventy-three men 
who held cabinet-level offices between 1868 and 1896, forty-eight had at some 
point either sat on railroad boards, lobbied for railroads, served railroad clients, or 
had family with meaningful railroad connections, including most prominently the 
suppo
General Richard Olney. Olney functions as a particularly vivid case-in-point of the 
influence of corporate interests in determining government policy, as it was he 
who committed federal power to forcibly (and brutally) break the Pullman Strike 
of 1894. During this period his financial compensation from his time serving the 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad one of the roads whose traffic was 
significantly tied up by the Strike
 5 
government salary. Apparently, the tentacles that Frank Norris suggested in The 
Octopus reached even into the highest councils of government. No wonder Jack 
ould was 
3  
capture in action, as much as an almost total regulatory co-optation, so thorough 
that the establishment of any effectual regime of regulation seemed almost 
impossible during this period even as an idea. It would be inaccurate, however, 
not to say unfair, to attribute this easy rapprochement between the federal 
government and the trusts to simple partiality and corruption alone. This 
confluence between public and private interests has always been an indelible 
feature of American government at all times, and was especially programmed in 
by the prevailing ideological climate of post-Civil War era. In an era of hyper-
partisanship, in which every presidential election was a brutally-contested, nail-
bitingly near-run grudge-
accord when it came to the sanctity and inviolability of property rights and the 
absolute necessity of strict laissez-faire and economy in government. Therefore, 
it was the Democratic president Grover Cleveland who piously promised at his 
y business interest as the result of 
                                                 
3 Jack Beatty, Age of Betrayal (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 192. 
 6 
support the Government the Government should not support the peo
vetoed federal aid to stricken farmers. And, except for a demagogical demurral 
might just as well have been uttered by most of his Republican rivals and 
contemporaries.4 As Andrew Martin has explained, by fixating on such small-bore 
issues and framing elections around such emotional lightning rods as the bloody 
-
alizing elites with the insulation they needed 
against the challenges to which the prior establishment of democratic institutions 
5 
And what of those democratic institutions? To contemporary sensibilities, 
accustomed to at least a persistent advocacy for government regulation of big 
business by reform groups even when effectual policy in this line is lacking, this 
can seem strange. Why did it take so long, until almost the end of the century, for 
an effective reform movement to arise advocating the regulation and policing of 
the largest corporations in the broader public interest? The real answer lay in the 
fact that most of the major movements for political reform of the past century or 
more, and therefore the only traditions of reform most Americans then knew or 
                                                 
4  
The New Republic, September 25, 2012, accessed October 
20, 2012, http://www.tnr.com/article/107721/which-us-president-does-romney-
most-resemble-hint-its-not-republican. 
5 Beatty, Age of Betrayal, 23. 
 7 
recognized as acceptable, had been largely oriented around the same sort of 
small-government shibboleths that now governed both of the two major parties. 
Jeffersonian Republicanism, Jacksonian Democracy, the Liberal Republicans of 
the 1870s, the Goo-Goos clamoring for civil service reform, and Henry George 
and his Single-Taxers, were all oriented (at least theoretically) around strongly 
anti-statist dogmas and rhetoric. Even George, who was widely considered one 
of the preeminent radicals of his time, chose to endorse Cleveland and fervently 
6 As Beatty has pointed out, even the rigorously stand-pat 
Cleveland was widely consid
broke out, albeit of the variety, as Matthew Josephson has wittily defined it, of 
7 
Louis Hartz perceptively defined the historical and ideological volte-face 
time so potent and all of the initial attempts to reform it so feeble when he pointed 
emocrat, with Jefferson, who in theory at 
least had opposed it [capitalism] and had developed the closest thing to a 
laissez-
century of growth, development, and consolidation,  
                                                 
6 Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American 
Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), 58. 
7 Jack Beatty, Age of Betrayal, 193. 
 8 
big capitalism was able now, with the major exception of the tariff, to 
dispense with the Hamiltonian promotionalism on which it had relied in the 
days of its weakness, especially since the corporate technique had 
become established and important.8  
In other words, 
Clay, Daniel Webster, or even Alexander Hamilton himself. Therefore, in seeking 
many American reform leaders since that time, latched onto the logical antinomy 
of this
9 After all, as Barzun has defined his 
indeed; not an ordinary turning point, but rather a turntable on which a whole 
10 The 
history, in which the old notions of (Hamiltonian) conservatism and (Jeffersonian) 
reform underwent great revolutions into forms still essentially recognizable and 
deeply relevant to us today. And the three men who incarnated and led those 
                                                 
8 Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American 
Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 1955), 215. 
9 James Chace, 1912: Wilson, Roosevelt, Taft & Debs the Election That 
Changed the Country (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), 59. 
10 Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural 
Life, 1500 to the Present (New York: Harper Collins, 2000), 615. 
 9 
revolutions on the reform side of the equation William Jennings Bryan, 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson would collectively pave the way for 
the modern American conception of liberalism. 
And yet, despite their seeming ideological accord, Bryan, Roosevelt, and 
Wilson, differed from each other strikingly in terms of origins and personalities. 
And certainly, the three evince an almost archetypal variety in their respective 
personal style and preferred leadership roles: Bryan, the consummate small-town 
middle American lawyer cum preacher cum editor; Roosevelt, the consummately 
the aggressive enthusiasm which characterized all of his endeavors; and Wilson, 
the consummately dry, even priggish academic for whom ideas (and ideals) had 
just as much force and reality (if not more so) than men. Moreover, these vividly 
contrasting personae take on an especial significance when considered within 
the context of the prevailing regional and class tensions which not only helped 
produce them but the political climate they sought to amend. 
  
beneath the shadow of the Civil War, regional consciousness was still perhaps 
the most imposing and significant cleavage in American life. John M. Cooper has 
perceptively observed that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
11 And, fittingly, Bryan, 
                                                 
11 Cooper, Pivotal Decades, 5. 
 
 10 
Roosevelt, and Wilson were each either native or adopted sons of one of these 
three regions.  
Paramount among these, as defined by Cooper, was the area to the north 
of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers and east of the Mississippi, (or, the Upper 
Midwestern and Northeastern states, in other words), which, while it comprised 
only one-six -five 
percent of its overall population and a still greater proportion of its commonly 
towns, money and banking institutions, schools and libraries, offices and 
12 And, significantly, as a New Yorker, Roosevelt was a 
epicenter. Moreover, Roosevelt grew up during the hothouse cultural atmosphere 
of the Civil War and Reconstruction, from which, like many others of his milieu 
(and political party,) he imbibed a passionate admiration for Abraham Lincoln and 
the Union cause. Tellingly, Roosevelt conflated these almost totally with the 
cause of the nation as a whole, saying of them during the debate over American 
intervention in the First World War, that during the Civil War the Union/North had 
                                                 
12 Cooper, Pivotal Decades, 5. 
 11 
13 
- e West and the South, were 
seriously economically and culturally deprived relative to the North, and were in 
most likely not a coincidence that Wilson and Bryan, who originally hailed from 
-long Democrats, who 
were very much the minority party at the time, while Roosevelt, who came from 
the wealthy, industrial North, was a Republican. Advocates for socio-economic 
refor
common cause all throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
from the Greenback movement of the 1870s, through the Populist uprising of the 
1890s, down to the New Deal in the 1930s.  
At the turn of the century, the area south of the Potomac and east of the 
recover economically and psychologically from its catastrophic military defeat 
and occupation. Much of its countryside still bore the scars of battlefield damage 
and the wealth of its ruling planter aristocracy had been greatly denuded (albeit 
not destroyed, thanks to replacement practices like sharecropping) by 
unremunerated emancipation. Worse still, its large Black population labored 
                                                 
13 John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and 
Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1983), 307. 
 12 
under a harsh regime of peonage, segregation, and disenfranchisement, and a 
significant and growing proportion of its population both White and Black found 
itself trapped in a crippling cycle of indebtedness thanks to its stultifying 
overreliance on the cotton monoculture. Moreover, despite its strenuous attempts 
throughout the 1880s and 1890s to make itself attractive to capital with rock-
bottom tax-rates, virtually non-existent economic regulations, and brutal, often 
violent, suppression of anything even remotely resembling an organized labor 
movement, the South stubbornly remained the most thoroughgoingly agrarian 
and thereby economically retrograde portion of the country. Wilson, a Virginian 
by birth who spent most of his childhood and early youth in Georgia and South 
Carolina, was shaped by this environment significantly, as can be evidenced by 
his ardent White suprematism, his rock-solid evangelical fervor, his youthful 
conservatism, and even perhaps in his preference for what C. Vann Woodward 
14 While he would 
eventually shed the ingrained (white) Southern shibboleths against strong central 
government and an active executive, he always seems to have conceived of their 
ideal uses in profoundly Jeffersonian (i. e. Southern) terms. Like Jefferson, 
Wilson conceived of government as a potential means of leveling the playing field 
s a disproportionate number of 
whom, one assumes, were Westerners, or, even better, Southerners might 
                                                 
14 C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South: 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951) 75-106. 
 13 
a 
disproportionate number of whom, again, one assumes, just happened to be 
Northern.15 
The vast expanse of the continent west of the Mississippi River was by far 
major socio-economic regions, Although the last major uprising of Native 
in 1893, much of it was still largely unsettled and undeveloped at the turn of the 
century. Much of the region was still given over to primitive economic activities 
like basic resource extraction (in the forms of mining and logging) or peripatetic 
herding across huge, nebulous ranching domains, all on a dauntingly gargantuan 
scale. 
economic deprivation. Only vast economies of scale could consistently turn a 
profit in a land of such harsh terrain, extreme weather conditions, and a crippling 
lack of reliable labor, demand, and infrastructure. Many who did try their hand at 
settled agriculture, mostly in the semi-arid prairie states, frequently found their 
efforts stymied by inclement climate, high cost of equipment, exceeding difficulty 
and cost in transporting goods to market, the excessive dearness of credit, 
                                                 
15 Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, 203 
 14 
chronic if not constant indebtedness, recurrent market gluts, and what historians 
from Richard Hofstadter to Donald Worster have diagnosed as a general and 
self-negating tendency to attempt to apply agricultural precepts and practices 
from Europe and the Eastern states to the altogether different and unsuitable 
conditions of the West.  
Although he lived his early years in Illinois, Bryan would spend most of his 
career as a paladin for the West in national politics. Charles Willis Thompson 
himself the 
average man of a large part of that country; he did not merely resemble that 
16 Throughout his life he would 
champion policies especially popular with Westerners, including free-silver, anti-
imperialism, and neutrality in the Great War. Indeed, it is telling that, although 
Bryan was always strongly pro-labor and in fact dearly needed the labor vote in 
the east to have any shot at winning the presidency, his regional identity fatally 
hamstrung his ability to effect a broad farmer-labor alliance. As Michael Kazin 
the only wage workers commonly familiar 
throughout the inland West mpany towns quite 
dissimilar from the swelling metropolises where factory hands and building 
                                                 
16 Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, And the Men Who Made 
It (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), 184. 
 15 
17 When considered in such a light, it is difficult not 
 
cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but 
destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the 
-so-veiled jab at the city-slicker East. The industrial East 
apparently found such appeals decidedly resistable, as Bryan never won a single 
electoral vote from the industrial heartland (excepting Maryland, a border state, in 
1908) in any of his three runs for the presidency. 
If any of these three men were merely parochial favorite sons, however, 
they never would have been able to command the truly national followings which 
emotional convalescence from the deaths of his first wife and mother by hunting 
and ranching in the rugged Dakota Territory were an integral part of his popular 
image. And his initiation and pursuit of conservation in the West with the 
Newlands and Antiquities Acts won him further popularity in the region. Wilson 
largely secured his national reputation in the Northeast as President of Princeton 
University and later as a crusading progressive Governor of New Jersey. 
Moreover, he could not have carried off his razor-thin 1916 re-election victory 
without making a clean sweep of all but four of the Western states. C. Vann 
                                                 
17 Michael Kazin, A Godly Hero: The Life of William Jennings Bryan (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 60-61. 
 16 
while Michael Kazin 
has shown that, although he won relatively few votes there, nearly 70% of 
-mail in the campaigns of 1896 and 1900 arrived from the rock-ribbed 
Republican Northeast and upper Midwest.18 In short, each candidate had at least 
the potential to bring together a formidable regional alliance behind him in 
support of either a run for office, agitation on behalf of a specific issue, or both. 
In a similar vein, each man stood for or led, or was widely believed to have 
stood for or led, a different, broadly construed socioeconomic class. The Populist 
movement that Bryan represented in 1896 (even if his identification with it was 
perhaps superficial or even, as some have claimed, a disingenuous ploy), and 
the broader populist tendency in progressive politics which he incarnated and led 
for long after, was always at least broadly proletarian in its character. It was 
moreover usually quite seriously so in its rhetoric. In the ringing final line of his 
 tellingly identifies the constituency he 
can convey ambiguous or even contradictory content, their broader political 
implications within the context of the times were crystal clear. Bryan saw himself 
as carrying the banner on behalf of the labor theory of value in particular, and the 
                                                 
18 C. Vann Woodward, The Burden of Southern History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1960), 150-151. 
 17 
radical socialist that Mark Hanna and other conservatives accused him of being, 
Bryan was almost certainly the most pro-labor candidate either of the major two 
parties had yet put forward, going so far as to pledge to make Samuel Gompers 
a member of his cabinet if elected in 1896. While Bryan was far from a 
proletarian himself, coming as he did from a comfortable middle-class family, he 
was still undeniably a member o
much, and, since his move to Nebraska in 1887, had ample exposure to a 
constituency but a few years removed from frontier conditions. 
In terms of class origins, Theodore Roosevelt presents, or at least seems 
to present, a strong contrast to the Great Commoner. Born into a venerable old 
Harvard, where he was a member of several prestigious fraternities and clubs, 
including the ultra-exclusive Porcellian Club, from which even his equally blue-
blooded younger cousin Franklin was rejected, Roosevelt was clearly a product 
of the nearest approximation late nineteenth-century America had to an 
ely inhered around a 
sense of noblesse oblige paternalism and social responsibility exemplified for him 
ople of 
culture, especially young men with college educations, to enter public life and 
 18 
19 Is there not something of the 
quintessential aristocratic polymath in the exuberant enthusiasm Roosevelt 
brought to his myriad extracurricular pursuits like sport, historiography, hunting, 
natural history, and international geopolitics and war? Roosevelt feels rather akin 
to a fairly common type in European political history, exemplified by figures such 
as Alphonse de Lamartine several generations earlier, and Winston Churchill a 
generation later: the aristocratic Renaissance man who descends from 
Parnassus into the more quotidian realm of politics whose various studies and 
 and (hopefully) 
enrich his understanding of the salient issues and policy proposals of the day. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Brooks Adams, were a significant influence on his 
conception of global geopolitics, just as his interest in natural history and 
concomitant friendships with leading environmentalists like John Muir and Gifford 
Pinchot inspired the new preservationist and conservationist policies of his 
administration respectively. 
Wilson, meanwhile, largely split the difference between the two men in 
terms of class origins and appeals, both in his biography, and, in a broader 
sense, in his policies. Born into the modest yet comfortable household of a 
middle-class Reverend, and 
experiences were defined neither by privilege nor hardship, and were in fact 
                                                 
19 Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World 
Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), 5. 
 19 
largely detached from either condition while leaving him ample opportunity to 
apprehend broad elements of both in action. Perhaps this is why throughout his 
broad American Mittelstand, though incorporating many of the concerns and 
desires of less privileged groups like laborers and farmers. This was ideally to be 
administrated faithfully by an elite class of educated and (doubtless) morally 
erest 
or values, which of course by default made it as incurably middle class as 
himself. Moreover, Wilson often voiced a faith in the overriding virtue and 
America, the part of America that makes new enterprises, the part into which the 
ambitious and gifted workingman makes his way up, the class that saves, that 
so much as a ding an sich but rather as a sort of hinge or way-station around 
which the rest of society turned. At one point he even went so far as to assert 
20 
All of these contrasts between the three men in terms of class and 
regional identity and appeal are certainly meaningful in terms of what they reveal 
about the candidates themselves. They are perhaps most significant to the extent 
to which they illustrate the intellectual heritage and political constituency which 
                                                 
20 Cooper, The Warrior and the Priest, 203. 
 20 
raised each of them to prominence, and, in the case of Roosevelt and Wilson, to 
power. For while progressivism is usually treated as a single, unified movement 
for reform, it is perhaps better understood as a broad complex of reform 
movements, or at the very least broad conceptions of reform. These were rooted 
in disparate historical antecedents and social philosophies, but all arose more or 
less in tandem and in response to problems and conditions that were essentially 
connate or at the least closely interrelated. From 
until the end of the First World War, Bryan, Roosevelt, and Wilson would each in 
their turn shepherd and lead one of these reformist paradigms into the national 
spotlight, and again in the case of the latter two, eventually into the highest 
realms of policy-making. 
Significantly, however, with the important exception of the election of 
1912, none of the three men ever really had to share the mantle of progressive 
leadership on the national stage at the same time. Bryan was the face (and, 
more importantly, voice) of progressivism at the national level from the election of 
1896 until the accession of Roosevelt to the presidency in 1901, who held the 
stage of the national progressive movement entirely to himself (Bryan being 
denied 
decision to retire it in 1908, whereupon Bryan briefly reemerged. In 1912, after 
bravura battle for the spotlight by Woodrow Wilson and a returning Roosevelt, 
which the former won (largely by default). Now unquestionably the star of the 
 21 
progressive movement, Wilson did not relinquish this stage until ruining his 
performance, himself, and practically the venue itself (including many members 
of the audience), and the entire drama ended as a tragedy. Like a play by Brecht, 
the sequence in which these various acts of the progressive movement 
succeeded one another was essentially dialectical in character.  
 The aforementioned class origins and characters of Bryan, Roosevelt, and 
Wilson provide an inlet into the character of this dialectical progression. Bryan 
and the agrarian populism whom he eventually came to embody and lead sought 
21 Theirs 
smallholders, tenant farmers, and they hoped eventually wage earners, 
people of limited to modest means. Such people were trapped (or believed 
themselves to be so) in the vises of indebtedness, isolation, and exploitation and 
eventually even government. Once united and with such instruments at their 
command, they hoped that they might be able to effectively stand up to the 
monopolists of the East and the big cities. Although they radically departed from 
the anti-statism of Jefferson and Jackson, they cited them in their efforts on 
behalf of farmers, artisans, and workers as their ideological forbears (even if this 
                                                 
21 Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny, 29-57. 
 22 
their pursuit of what they considere 22 At bottom, Bryan and 
the populists sought to empower the powerless of their time through organization 
ocratic Party), municipal 
or state governments, or even the federal government in Washington. 
 This Populist-Bryanite thesis for reform was vigorously opposed and 
highest circles of political and economic power, best personified and eventually 
led by a dynamic young Theodore Roosevelt. In many ways was a belated 
product of the Goo-
flirted with the Mugwump revolt of 1884 before finally resolving to hold his nose 
and support James G. Blaine.  However, he and the reform currents he 
eventually came to embody and lead diverged strikingly from them, just as  the 
Populists did from the Jefferson-Jackson tradition, in their willingness and even 
eagerness to countenance assertive government intervention to counter growing 
corporate power. But almost antithetically to Bryan and the Populists (to say 
nothing of the rising Socialist movement, which they feared and abhorred even 
more) however, Roosevelt and the other Square Dealers (and later New 
Nationalists) saw this intervention not so much as a means of empowering the 
powerless per se, but rather as a somewhat paternalistic means of bringing the 
cting the general public from their 
                                                 
22 Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2007), 142. 
 23 
most flagrant frauds and abuses. Of course, there was a great deal of noblesse 
oblige about such attitudes, especially when one considers how elite and wealthy 
most of its practitioners were, but it must be owned that the benevolent umpire 
interests. 
 
expanded dramatically. His bruited New Nationalism program taking his 
Hamiltonian notions of reform considerably further while incorporating some new 
planks concerning social justice like woman suffrage and a rudimentary welfare 
state. When he ran on this platform at the head of his new Bull Moose Party, he 
found his way blocked by the emergence of a new progressive leader from the 
Democratic Party bearing with him his own conception of reform, Woodrow 
-up approach to reform (albeit from within the framework of a 
seemingly more Jeffersonian brand of economic democracy), once in office he 
pursued these goals in tandem with many measures lifted largely from the top-
down, New Nationalist playbook pushed by Roosevelt (which he had ironically 
once denigrated and opposed throughout his campaign). In action, therefore, the 
New Freedom tended to function like a rather rough synthesis of the two prior 
conceptions of progressivism promulgated by Bryan and Roosevelt respectively. 
 24 
continued to play the role of man in the middle between Bryan and Roosevelt. 
This took place in the key debates raised by the outbreak of war in Europe, 
eventually, intervention on the Allied side and arbitration at the Versailles 
Conference. When his Treaty failed in the Senate, Wilson suffered a debilitating 
stroke, and the entire progressive movement fell badly out of balance, collapsing 
under a harsh reaction in 1919 and 1920 that led to a bloody Red Scare and 
eventually the lan
under Warren G. Harding. 
 25 
THESIS: 
THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 
 
One of the signal ironies of the late nineteenth century is that the first 
protest movement of truly national dimensions against the forces of 
industrialization, urbanization, above all else, corporate consolidation than 
remaking American society arose out of a milieu as yet seemingly far removed 
from their direct effects. The rural areas of the South, Great Plains, and Far West 
excluding California at that time were notably deficient in huge, decadent 
metropolises, dark Satanic mills (or indeed industrialization of any kind), or 
waves of impoverished and hapless European immigrants (especially in the 
South). And yet it was there that the Populist movement, which even the 
23 Contrary to the 
predictions of Karl Marx and other such theorists of class struggle, the new 
industrial-
 
their socioeconomic antinomies (except at the level of income, of course), rural 
and provincial smallholders who were decidedly remote from any centers of 
                                                 
23 Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1955), 61. 
 26 
reform would in the long run turn out to have wide-ranging influence and 
implications and would help to catalyze progressivism in large cities and, 
eventually, the national government in Washington.24 What Richard Hofstadter 
once said of the United States in general feels even more á propos when applied 
25 
But perhaps the fact that remote farmers were the first to mount a 
sustained revolt against the social inequities of the new corporate order is 
understandable when one considers how the political culture of the nineteenth 
century had in many ways primed them for the role. Generations spent absorbing 
 chosen 
deep and persistent sense of civic self-esteem if not paramountcy. Perhaps it 
was for this reason that Bryan was, as his biographer Michael Kazin has put it, 
egitimacy of nearly every major reform for which 
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was still far from implausible when the Populist agitations began, with a full half 
of all Americans still making their living directly from farming as late as 1880, and 
the cities not outstripping the countryside in population (and then only just) until 
1920. In other words, while Hofstadter may have been partially correct that some 
of the impetus for Populism derived from a collective crisis of confidence among 
contention that the greater portion of it could just as easily have arisen from a 
deeper, abiding sense of their own importance and their concomitant belief in 
their right to take control of and direct (rather than simply thwart or resist) said 
forces seems at least equally if not more plausible. 
The long pedigree and continued prevalence of the labor theory of value, 
at least at the popular level, in the United States gave the Populists further 
confidence in the historical righteousness of their cause. As Beatty has explained 
political rhetoric throughout the 19th  James 
27 
                                                 
26 Kazin, A Godly Hero, xv. 
27 Beatty, Age of Betrayal, 357-358. 
 28 
 
still credited with the creation of wealth. Unlike the more doctrinaire Marxist 
status to those who worked at manual labor, but instead believed, as Postel has 
farmers, mechanics, miners, craftsmen, doctors, editors, and manufacturers
might be included in the expansive and fluid category 
28 
ted by the 
29 
is well illustrated even at the level of their protest songs. In 1840 radical 
Democrats canvassing to re-elect Martin Van Buren sang what they called a 
Producer
which they exhorted 
Then let the working class,  
As a congregated man,  
Behold an insidious enemy:  
For each Banker is a foe,  
And his aim is for our woe   
                                                 
28 Postel, Populist Vision, 224. 
29 Kazin, A Godly Hero 61. 
 29 
canker-worm of liberty!30  
(emphasis in original). 
A half-century later, their grandsons were singing of similar themes, albeit 
in a decidedly darker tone: 
Oh Kansas fool, poor Kansas fool!  
  
The bankers followed us out west  
And did in mortgages invest  
And looked ahead and shrewdly planned  
31  
The demonology of 1840 has survived remarkably intact, but the appeal to 
class-based collective action and self-assertion has been replaced by a bitter, 
almost pitiable sense of helplessness and defeat that broke into outright 
vengefulness in other, more strident songs sung on the prairie:  
When brokers are freed from all their harm  
And lobbyists are dead  
  
And come to us for bread.32  
The essential purpose of the Populist movement, therefore, was to find 
practical means of replacing these fears and resentments with at least the 
possibilities of collective empowerment and hope for a better future. As Postel 
social movement that represented a distinctly modernizi 33 The key 
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 30 
being effected by Gould, Cooke, Hanna, and others was that the former ideally 
conceived of modernity in terms of forces which would make the American 
economy and American society more egalitarian, rather than more stratified. One 
of the most striking things about the leadership of the Populist movement at 
least in the West  is how truly humble and modest much of its leadership was in 
its origins, at least compared to their solidly respectable opponents. Almost all of 
them really do seem to have represented a broad cross-section of the sort of 
terms of class origins and backgroun
like Leonidas Polk and Adolph Sutro came from positions of wealth and privilege, 
the working or lower-middle-class origins of Charles Macune, John B. Rayner, 
Luna Kellie to say nothing of labor leaders associated with the movement like 
John McBride and Martin Irons is much more indicative of the type, with even 
the solidly bourgeois Bryan seeming almost well-to-do in such company.  
Moreover, it is striking how strongly the measurable rank-and-file support 
for the 
34 For example, C. Vann 
Woodward has cited how in Texa
                                                 
34 Postel, The Populist Vision, 224. 
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l districts, to a considerable extent, in 
inverse proportion to the prevalence of the Negroes [who were mostly 
35 Elaborating upon Woodward, 
Steven Hahn, in his study of the rise of populism in the Georgia upcountry, has 
described the populist movement as both a regional and class conflict, pitting the 
large-scale planters of the plantation belt, who controlled and overwhelmingly 
supported the dominant Democratic Party, against the middling yeomen of the 
piedmont wh
commonwealth of producers to be realized through public regulation of 
36 
And yet, while populism in practice was often predicated around class 
conflict, the populists, much like the subsequent progressives they would at least 
partially inspire involved in the Square Deal, the New Nationalism and the New 
 benefiting one industry or 
profession at the expense of another, and therefore frequently used as a term of 
opprobrium. Instead, the Populists saw themselves and their movement as 
a baggy term 
engrossing disparate occupations, industries, and even certain professions
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arrayed against the growing power of large industrial combinations and 
and other giant corporations.37 
In other words, the populists sought to fight fire with fire, reasoning that if 
superior organization and pooling of resources and expertise had helped a small 
th, and even to a large extent the government itself, 
same. As the movement developed throughout the 1880s and 1890s, however, 
m measures to achieve 
power outright, whether in the form of their own political party in 1892, and 
 1896. 
And yet that such a thing might come to pass at all would have seemed 
well-nigh unthinkable to many Populists as recently as five years before. At that 
Populist Representative in the Fifty-third Congress Marion Cannon memorably 
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Angeles to forever eschew any and all ties to both the Democratic and 
, our fortunes, and our 
38 In the South, where the Democrats employed 
rampant fraud, intimidation, violence, and recently, widespread disfranchisement 
of blacks and many poor whites, an alliance with the Democracy was a 
partic
that November, many disillusioned Populists complained that Fusion under Bryan 
in general, and the silver panacea in particular had been essentially little more 
than a ploy by t
-fated running mate on the Populist ticket that year, 
ell nigh killed it. The sentiment is still 
agree, with C. Vann Woodward concluding with all his trademark irony
the primary purpose of the old party [i.e. the Democrats] was a national victory 
39 
Why, then, given the great breadth and depth of mistrust and disdain for 
the two major parties among many of the Populists
Party would never have been created in the first place, of course would they 
ultimately choose to tie themselves to the Democratic nominee, William Jennings 
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Bryan, and thereby compromise their hard-won insurgency and political 
independence? This seemingly enormous volte-face on the part of the Populists 
is even more surprising when one recalls that they were largely persuaded to 
his, the 
in Chicago. Much of the answer lies in the fact that, for all of the rhetorical 
owed much of its electoral success to either fusion tickets with one or the other of 
them, or the endorsement and support of same. Indeed, as Postel has pointed 
out, even Cannon, for all of his self-righteous truculence, largely owed his House 
seat to the endorsement of the Democratic Party in 1892. Moreover, in states like 
Nebraska, Colorado, and Kansas all but the most die- -of-the-
[i.e. rejecting any connection with either of the major two parties] candidates 
accepted such cooperation as a virtual requirement for survival in a first past the 
post electoral system.40 
However, it was the personal character and, more importantly, the 
ideological convictions as expressed by the nominee himself which largely 
served as the determining factor in temporarily bringing the Populists to the 
Bryan, who seems to have imbibed liberally from his father the radical 
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mixtu
around him.41 In his race for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1890, for 
instance (the only election he ever won, incidentally), Bryan essentially endorsed 
the precursor to the including the 
-
gold.42 Indeed, it is telling that even the nationalization of the railroads the one 
demand of the insurgents that Bryan (no doubt deliberately) ignored in 1890
would eventually be taken up by him in his 1908 bid for the presidency. Once in 
Congress, however, it was the bimetallism plank which above all others most 
of the decade. 
so hard for the silver panacea can at first blush seem to be bizarre if not rather 
foolish. Americans have gotten so used to money whose value is arbitrarily 
determined that even after the major financial panic of 2008, calls for a return to 
metal-backed currency has remained confined to a small (but vocal) segment of 
the rightmost fringe in American politics. So why exactly did the prospect of the 
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free coinage of silver drive so many at the time to such levels of apocalyptic 
-1890s, most 
Americans assumed that wealth consisted largely of products that were tangible 
and visible
fault lay in a surplus or shortage of the shiny commodities, or specie, on which 
43  
The silver panacea may also have owed much of its popularity among 
Democrats to an inchoate sense of party heritage. Currency and financial reform 
in the form of the Specie Circular and Hard Money agitation of the 1830s was 
ith several flattering 
references to important figures from the Bank War such as Thomas Hart Benton 
and, of course, Old Hickory himself, who Bryan rather grandiloquently claims 
of history, Jackson sounded like nothing so much as a proto-populist, such as 
44 Moreover, 
this party heritage of currency reform may well have outlived Bryan and the 
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Popocrats. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that when the next great 
depression hit, another Democrat (and one far less credulous than Bryan at that) 
would, among many other attempted reform remedies, take the nation off the 
matter), some responded with apocalyptic fervor, solemnly intoning, among other 
45  
However, while i
eventually chose to endorse him. Rather it was because the speech did such a 
rousing job of placing the bimetallism issue within much broader questions of 
Indeed, Michael Kazin has grasped the larger argument of the speech well when 
beginning of the speech, Bryan makes it clear how truly expansive and weighty 
to you in defense of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty the cause of 
 46 Thus, as befitting the fundamentalist piety of Bryan and many in his 
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46 Kazin, A Godly Hero, 59. 
 38 
audience, the coming struggle was described as having an almost religious 
significance. 
However, it was most likely not the appeals to tradition or the past in 
 
speech, but rather the way he expertly played on their collective desire for parity 
corporations of the East. In other words, as Michael Kazin has 
moral equity
47 Bryan began this appeal by lightly and 
deftly playing on the regional antagonisms motivating many agrarian insurgents 
by 
before moving on to a more substantive explication of the economic grievances 
48 
Bryan rhetorically addressed the wealthy magnates of the east coast, 
to you that you have made the 
on as broad and as forward-looking an explication of the labor theory of value 
                                                 
47 Kazin, A Godly Hero, 60. 
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employer, the attorney in a country town is as much a business man as  
the corporation counsel in a great metropolis; the merchant at the  
crossroads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New  
  
by the application of brain and muscle to the natural resources of the  
country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes  
upon the board of trade and bets upon the price of grain; the miners who  
go down a thousand feet into the earth, or climb two thousand feet upon  
the cliffs, and bring forth from their hiding places the precious metals to be  
poured into the channels of trade are as much business men as the few  
49  
 
In this remarkable passage we see Bryan vividly expound the labor theory 
of value as seen through the prism of what Postel has described as the 
formulation on its head by insisting that virtually anyone who was economically 
other words, Bryan sou
were currently languishing in) the middle American countryside. In this he 
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difficulties and who consequently abjured third-party politics. For example, former 
-Treasury Plan 
ng 




populists and in line with many of their own ideals, there can also be little doubt 
51 Indeed, a
the farmer 
and industrial worker were businessmen too, Bryan insisted and he was careful 
ed, for all of his supposed 
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not invade the home of the provident in order to supply the wants of the 
52 
which, while they were no doubt intended by Bryan to convey a sense of the 
moral equity between the great cities of the East and the hinterlands of the West 
and South which victualled and supplied them, feel rather more like the 
backward-looking, reactionary gripes of a Luddite against the city slickers:  
t cities are in favor of the gold  
standard; we reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and fertile  
prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will  
spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will  
53 
 
While later critics of the populist tendency in politi in general and Bryan in 
particular, including most notably H. L. Mencken and Richard Hofstadter, would 
provinciality and narrow-
mindedness, there can be little denying that at times he gave them more than 
enough to work with.  
movement co-opted and diluted by the Democrats, and consequently reviled 
of squelching the Populist challenge in the South, many Southern Populists were 
particularly vehement in their rejection of fusion under Bryan. At the 1896 
Populist National Convention in St. Louis, for example, one outraged delegate 
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Democrats included widespread fraud, intimidation, violence, and eventually the 
almost wholesale disenfranchisement of blacks and many poor whites, it is 
scarcely surprising that he should have bitterly answered his own question by 
D
American political mainstream, where the stakes for both future failures and 
successes would be exponentially higher. 
 That the failure of the Fusion ticket in 1896 inflicted a mortal wound on the 
more radical and independent strains of the populist movement to wreck. This 
interpretation elides, however, how seriously Bryan was taken as a challenge to 
the prevailing laissez-faire, Gilded Age consensus of the time, both by those who 
supported that consensus and those who opposed it. In the case of the former, 
Goldman has recounted how conservatives at the time pilloried Bryan as, among 
 43 
54 Meanwhile, many independent and radical 
figures like Henry George, John Peter Altgeld, and even Eugene Debs (not yet a 
socialist, but drifting that way) all heartily endorsed the Commoner, with the latter 
the 
55 Moreover, Bryan went to far greater lengths 
to court organized labor than any previous candidate from the two major parties, 
advocating the regulation of big business by the Federal government at a huge 
Labor Day picnic in Chicago, and even promising to induct President of the 
American Federation of Labor Samuel Gompers into his Cabinet.  
 If anything, it was not Bryan or even fusion with the Democrats that 
ultimately undermined the populist movement, but rather the silver panacea that 
brought them all down together. While the free silver issue may not have been 
Populists distracted from other, more substantive reforms, it is hard not to agree 
 
cow-
the sacrifices and labour of others, and then it laid its eggs in it, pushing out the 
56 Specifically, by emphasizing the 
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silver issue so heavily in 1896, Bryan and the populists may very well have 
alienated the urban wage workers they so desperately needed to eke out an 
 interests of rural and civic labor are the same; their 
indebted wheat and cotton farmers of the West and South stood to benefit the 
most by the inflationary effects that would be wrought by a return to the free 
coinage of silver. For all of their high-minded appeals to principle and the need to 
not compensate for the hard economic fact that, as Michael Kazin has explained, 
urban, wage-  
only suffer if a change in the currency drove up prices for food and other 
57 
 However, while the silver plank would ultimately fail and drag the populist 
movement as thing-in-itself down with it, many of their other major goals would 
eventually come to be achieved either in whole or in part in the generation or so 
following the Fusion campaign of 1896. Two of their most significant bruited 
political reforms the establishment of a progressive tax on income and the 
direct election of U.S. Senators would eventually be enacted in 1913 via the 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments to the Constitution respectively, with 
none other than then-Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan enjoying the 
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New Freedom, including the Smith-Lever Act, the Federal Farm Loan Act, and 
several others which when taken together almost constituted a sort of facsimile of 
-Treasury Plan. Perhaps most significantly of all, however, in the 
decade or so following their defeat under Bryan, many Populists matriculated into 
the reform wings of the Democratic and Republican Parties, where their ideals of 
regulation and big business and the use of organization and institutions to extend 
parity and opportunity to the relatively disempowered would inspire much of the 
impetus for the progressive movement to follow. As Charles Postel has vividly 
-handed Populist shared much ideological ground with 
the university- 58  
And what of Bryan himself, the man who briefly captured the movement 
virtues, it is probably ultimately for the best that he never became president, it is 
also difficult to deny the long-range influence he would have, not only on the 
progressive movement that he helped to define but on what eventually 
until the rise of Wilson, and was consequently its perennial candidate of choice, 
winning the Democratic presidential nomination again in 1900 and 1908 (with the 
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conservative wing interpolating Alton B. Parker in 1904), and, while both of these 
later campaigns were even less successful than his 1896 run, they also helped to 
introduce and articulate new reformist ideas into national politics, such as 
opposition to imperialism in the case of the former and calls for the taming of big 
business in the latter. Most importantly, the notion espoused by Bryan, that the 
Federal government ought to intervene directly to aid those hurt or threatened by 
economic calamity, while rejected by the electorate in 1896, would prove 
remarkably durable and influential in the long run, helping to pave the way for the 
success of a similar appeal made by Franklin Roosevelt thirty-six years later. As 
scientific and social views and his loudly trumpeted evangelical piety, the fiscal 
and economic policies they forward would be unrecognizable and perhaps even 
nonexistent without his influence. 
 47 
ANTITHESIS: 
THE ROOSEVELT PROGRAM 
 
progressive movement, in the person of Theodore Roosevelt, finally moved into 
the White House. But it was to be a progressivism far removed and much further 
59 
vision, or ambition as Americans would come to learn over the next generation. 
Although he was relatively judicious and restrained in the measures he 
promulgated as president (particularly in comparison with the policies he 
advocated later), Roosevelt expended much of his trademark vigor in erecting a 
workable and practical raft of reforms to restrain some of the most flagrant 
abuses of the larges
protection for the general public as guaranteed by the government.60 While Bryan 
and the Popocrats dreamed of an i
of and transforming the federal government, Roosevelt and his associates sought 
(and largely effected) an administrative revolution from above which in a few 
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short years managed to upend much of the once well-nigh impregnable Gilded 
Age consensus. 
Like the Populists and their rather strained but vital sense of descent from 
the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian movements, Roosevelt and his reform 
contingent also grew out of a historical heritage, albeit one that was much more 
recent and with a legacy much more defined by its persistent frustrations than by 
great, long-
-
and perhaps in a broader sense even the ill-starred Liberal Republican uprising 
of the Reconstruction era. Like many others of his class, educational 
background, and regional milieu, Roosevelt abhorred the easy venality of the era 
in which he came of age and deplored it as both a cause and a symptom of the 
supposed accelerating vulgarization of American society in general and 
American politics in particular following the Civil War. The undisputed intellectual 
sine qua non of this type, Henry Adams, has left an indelible expression of the 
snobbish derision mixed with no small amount of fear with which the patrician 
class of the late nineteenth-
politicians: 
The type was pre-intellectual, archaic, and would have seemed so even to  
the cave-   
with differences and variations, as normal; men whose energies were the  
greater, the less they wasted on thought; men who sprang from the soil to  
power; apt to be distrustful of themselves and of others; shy; jealous;  
sometimes vindictive; more or less dull in outward appearance; always  
 49 
needing stimulants; but for whom action was the highest stimulant the  
instinct of fight.61  
 
Indeed, in his spirited opposition to the nomination of James G. Blaine by the 
Republican Party in 1884, a touch of such high-minded priggishness sometimes 
62 
 
Gilded Age, however, lay not in how he followed in their footsteps, but rather in 
how he deviated from them. As historian Richard Hofstadter has perceptively 
 
A recruit from the same social and educational strata as the reform 
leaders, he [Roosevelt] decided at an early age that the deficiencies  
charged against them were real, and that if reform was to get anywhere,  
their type must be replaced by a new and more vigorous kind of leader  
from the same class.63 
 
He may therefore have seriously flirted with the Mugwump rebellion of 1884, but 
in the end finally resolved to swallow his misgivings and remain loyal to his party. 
64 
Roosevelt was even able to develop a sense of humor about the whole affair, in 
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stark contrast to his earlier, loudly-trumpeted (self-)righteousness, at one point 
playfully offering a mock diagnosis to the powerful arch-Mugwump editor, Ernest 
Lawrence Godkin, who had attacked him vehemently through his New York 
Evening Post for truckling t
65 True to form, Godkin, and with him 
much of the high-minded Goo-
failed to take the ribbing, and became one of 
persistent public critics. 
 
archetypical Gilded Age spoilsman, it is noteworthy not only how strongly 
Roosevelt contrasts with many of its clauses, but how appositely certain others 
seem to apply to him. While to be sure nobody would ever mistake Roosevelt for 
doubtless not fail to notice that he had a marked tendency (in his weaker 
action was the highest stimulant
characteristics, however, far from being the deficiencies which Adams 
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and, consequently, his political effectiveness, or, as Richard Hofstadter has 
memorably put it,  
it was one of the major sources of his popularity at large, toward the end 
of  the century, that he could be portrayed as an Easterner, a writer, and a  
Harvard man from the well-to-do classes who nevertheless knew how to  
get along with cowboys and Rough Riders.66 
   
 Moreover, Roosevelt himself was acutely aware of this. Consider for 
example the not-so-subtly implied contrast he drew between himself and the 
Godkin-style reformers, whom he penetratingly derided in his Autobiography as 
political corruption and discussed it in drawing rooms and parlors, but who were 
wholly unable to grapple wit 67 
 While Roosevelt may have disdained the ineffectuality and even the 
-Goos, and generally managed to even rise above their 
snobbishness, he was still far from being an arrant proletarian or even a Bryanite 
how he consistently expressed a powerful fear of anything which to him smacked 
of radicalism, whether it was something as truly drastic as socialism (which he 
-style journalism (which he accused of 
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68 Not surprisingly then, Roosevelt was a 
fierce critic of the populist movement in general, and Bryan in particular. He 
-socialistic agrarian movement, with free silver 
as a mere incident, supported mainly because it is hoped thereby to damage the 
 69 
attack against the latter as his running mate in the election of 1900. Something 
more of the class divide and, consequently, profound differences in social 
attitudes separated Rooseveltian from Populistic-style reform and is vividly 
speeches in 1896. According to Roosevelt, the crowd was primarily comprised of 
place of a missing window-pane, and who is more likely to be found at the cross-
roads grocery store than behind the 70 Indeed, Roosevelt is reported to 
have said of the populist movement that  
[t]he sentiment now animating a large proportion of our people can only be 
suppressed as the Commune in Paris was suppressed, by taking ten or a  
dozen of their leaders out [which would presumably include Bryan],  
 71 
 
And, indeed, with utterances and attitudes such as these, it is no wonder that the 
real nature of his ideological identity remains a point of contention. Was he, as 
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historians like Howard K. Beale, John M. Cooper, and John Morton Blum have 
insisted, not really a progressive as such, but rather more of an activist or 
meliorist conservative who, to paraphrase Macaulay, reformed so that he might 
conserve? Even Er
evasive about trusts, compromising on social legislation, purblind to the merits of 
72 Moreover, it 
could be argued that the top-down, noblesse oblige character of the reforms 
which Roosevelt sought, whether in office or out, is itself an indication of an 
essentially conservative temperament. As John Morton Blum has explained 
-imposed order was in his time no longer to be 
government equipped to define, particularly for a powerful executive prepared to 
enforce, the revised rules under which the America of immense corporations, of 
enormous cities, of large associations of labor and farmers could in orderly 
manner resolve its c 73 Although conservatives typically 
tend to balk at expansions of governmental power (at least in the economic 
realm), Blum insisted that Roosevelt sought a larger role for government for 
ened power precisely for the purpose 
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of establishing order 74 Perhaps this is what Hofstadter meant 
75  
 
advocated, basically reflect this essentially Burkean conception of progressive 
reform. Specifically in the sense of that precept of Burke famously cited by the 
progressive muckraking journalist, Ray Stannard Baker, in reference to 
exist unless a controlling power upon will and 
76 Roosevelt felt that those most fit to furnish this 
d as against demagogy and mob 
backgrounds of comfort, privilege, and, so they liked to flatter themselves, of 
disinterested civic virtue.77 Unlike populism, which was insurgent and devoted to 
a comprehensive redistribution of power, if not wealth, the Square Deal was 
essentially custodial in nature, and sought instead to clean up and contain the 
worst excesses of industrial capitalism and regulate certain economic activities 
and resources in a broader public (i.e. not just lower class) interest. Of course, 
such an ethos of stewardship
less fortunate fellows service, inspiration, and guidance
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would require a very high standard of administrative ability to be effective. 
Therefore the as-
important role as the new stewards of policy.78 And since, as Blum has 
American people had access to the kind of education and professional training 
y an elite of 
79 
 
station as of talent. At various points during his seven and half-years in the White 
House, Roosevelt had serving under him the son of a former president as his 
secretary of the interior, a grand-nephew of a French emperor as his secretary of 
the navy and attorney general, and even a former private secretary to Abraham 
Lincoln as his secretary of state. In other words, like McKinley, who sprinkled his 
government with solid, on-the-make Midwesterners like himself, Roosevelt built 
his cabinet of men much in his own image. Of the twenty-four men who served in 
-one were either born or established their careers in 
-
Roosevelt tended to place a special amount of trust in fellow New Yorkers like 
Elihu Root, George B. Cortelyou, and Oscar Straus. Significantly, most of them 
were in po
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together, whether it was a prominent or wealthy family (like Secretary of the 
Interior James R. Garfield and Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General 
Charles J. Bonaparte, or Roos
Lengerke Meyer), an Ivy League education (including Secretary of State John 
Hay, Secretary of War William Howard Taft, and even Oscar Straus, a Jewish 
or), or a 
preeminence in the fields of business or the law (as with Secretary of War and 
later State Elihu Root and Attorney General Philander C. Knox). Even the 
-versatile Cortelyou, who served 
as Secretary of Commerce and Labor, Postmaster General and finally Secretary 
of the Treasury by turns, and who came up without much money, a prestigious 
education, or much professional experience beyond public administration, had, 
like his chief, at least the relative good fortune to be descended from a venerable 
old New York family with roots which stretched back to the days of Dutch rule.  
 So how precisely did Roosevelt and his lieutenants effect their reforms 
from the top-down? For a start, they strongly re-asserted the supremacy of the 
-
were arguably justified on purely legal grounds alone, their real importance lay 
more in the establishment of a principle, particularly in the instance of the first 
such lawsuit he pursued against the Northern Securities Company in 1902. As 
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Court [in the E. C. Knight case] had, with seeming definiteness, settled that the 
in the Northern Securities Co. v. United States. 
80 In other words, in order to act effectually as an arbiter 
of the public interest, Roosevelt believed the government had to be truly above 
any specific private interests or individuals. No doubt a similar impulse motivated 
latter personally visited the White House to try to straighten things out with the 
president.  
 And yet, that tense tête-à-tête (or rather tête-à-tête-à-tête, as Attorney 
General Knox was apparently also present) also contains an illuminating 
relationship between government and business, but about what a departure this 
attitude was from the consensus of the Gilded Age. As Roosevelt remembered it 
, when 
Morgan asked Roosevelt why the government had not simply asked him directly 
 
Roosevelt:  That is just what we did not want to do. 
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Morgan:  If we have done anything wrong, send your man to my man 
and they can fix it up (emphasis mine). 
Roosevelt:   
Knox:   
Morgan:  Are you going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust 
and others? 
Roosevelt:  Certainly not unless we find out that in any case they have 
done something that we regard as wrong (emphasis mine).81 
almost off-handed rapprochement 
between business and government would have almost certainly sufficed for any 
other president of the previous thirty years or so, and would in fact have probably 
been unnecessary to begin with. In other words, the Gilded Age was truly over, 
and Morgan (and many others like him) just had not realized it yet. Moreover, 
only for why it was over, 
but what he hoped to put into its place in the coming years. 
Unlike Bryan and the Populists, who opposed the trusts while seeking 
similar methods to empower themselves like consumer cooperatives, or Wilson 
and his supporters, who labeled the trusts a danger to free enterprise and whose 
New Freedom was intended to restore competition and opportunity on behalf of 
the enterprising individual, Roosevelt had no objection to large-scale business 
consolidation as a ding an sich, and in fact regarded it as an unavoidable and 
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even potentially positive concomitant of industrial modernization. As he put it in 
his second State of the Union Address,  
[o]ur aim is not to do away with corporations; on the contrary, these big   
aggregations are an inevitable development of modern industrialism, and  
the effort to destroy them would be futile unless accomplished in ways that 
would work the utmost mischief to the entire body politic.82 
 
Unlike many conservatives at the time and since, Roosevelt did not believe that 
the state should adopt a laissez-faire approach toward these new economic 
combinations. Instead he believed that strong regulation from the top (as 
opposed to insurgency or catalyzing competition from the bottom) was  required 
to maintain order and a certain modicum of social mobility and peace. As 
Roosevelt explained more fully in his Autobiography
,  
the government must now interfere to protect labor, to subordinate the big  
corporation to the public welfare, and to shackle cunning and fraud exactly  
as centuries before it had interfered to shackle the physical force which 
does wrong by violence (emphases mine).83 
 
When justified by rhetoric such as this, is it any wonder that John M. Cooper has 
was i
                                                 
82 Theodore Roosevelt
Center, accessed January 3, 2013, 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3774. 
83 Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition, 222-223. 
 60 
84 
Bull Moose campaign of 1912, many of the other major domestic reforms he 
pursued throughout his presidency seem to have been imbued with something of 
the same spirit.  
 Consider the first of the duties that Roosevelt enumerated for the 
government in his Autobiography, 
action Roosevelt pursued in this line, occurring appropriately enough at around 
the same time as the Northern Securities lawsuit, was his decision to intervene in 
the anthracite coal strike in northeastern Pennsylvania in 1902. Theoretically, the 
government was only playing the role of a neutral, honest broker between the 
United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), led by their president John Mitchell, 
and the mine owners, represented by president of the Philadelphia and Reading 
Railroad George Frederick Baer. In practice, however, by refusing to 
unequivocally (or even tacitly) take the side of management, as Cleveland had 
done in the case of the Pullman Strike, and referring the controversy to an 
arbitral commission which eventually gave the strikers much of what they 
wanted, plus de facto recognition henceforward for the UMWA, Roosevelt was 
seen by his intervention, even if only by default, as more favorable toward 
workers than any other previous federal intervention in a strike before. To a 
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judgment specifically the exceptionally stubborn obstinacy and arrogant 
served in de
but the case was 
 general sympathy for the labor movement.85 And, not 
surprisingly, Roosevelt supported the organization of labor for the same reason 
he supported (albeit with reservations) the consolidation of business interests, 
86 
 And what of the second fundamental task Roosevelt assigned to the 
 the public 
be interpreted as contributing to this goal, the most significant measure 
promulgated under this aegis would most likely be the Hepburn Act of 1906. By 
giving the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) the power to establish 
maximum railroad rates, the measure sought to end the price discrimination than 
widely prevailing between small-scale and large-scale shippers, and in a manner 
 for top-down control. Moreover, by giving 
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uniform standard of bookkeeping for their records, the legislation helped to 
facilitate both the further consolidation of railroads and their more effective 
monitoring by the federal government, two developments very much in line with 
concomitant necessity of oversight from above. Roosevelt himself claimed as 
much in his 1905 State of the Union Address when, after unequivocally stating 
his preference for private rather than public ownership and management of the 
railway system (again, no socialist he), he insisted that: 
it [the railway system] can only be so managed on condition that justice is  
done the public   
do is to develop an orderly system, and such a system can only come 
through the gradually increased exercise of the right of efficient   
government control (emphasis mine).87 
 
The third clause Roosevelt identified in his slate of responsibilities for the federal 
in the two food-safety measures that Roosevelt enacted in 1906, the Pure Food 
and Drug Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act. While these measures were 
The Jungle, they 
-down, paternalist approach to reform 
than with any sort of proletarian empowerment advocated by Sinclair. Instead 
they granted power to the federal government through the newly-created Food 
and Drug Administration to (in the case of the Pure Food and Drug Act) prohibit 
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the sale, production, or transportation across interstate lines of any fraudulently 
labeled or adulterated drugs or foodstuffs and (in the case of the Meat Inspection 
Act) to rigorously inspect meat products and police sanitation standards in the 
stockyards. In other words, highly placed and educated experts were going to 
regulate and clean up (quite literally in this instance) the excesses and 
deleterious effects of the corporate order, partially (or so the president would 
claim) to blunt exactly the kind of socialist agitation described by Sinclair. 
-
behaved) consolidation, one of the most influential agents lobbying for the 
reforms was the consortium of great packing houses in Chicago popularly known 
as 
wanted a stricter regime of regulation and inspection for two reasons:  
[1.] to facilitate the sale of American meat in foreign markets [where the 
quality of American meat products was widely distrusted], and [2.] to strike 
at the domestic competition of the 300 or so small packers who supplied 
half the American market, often sold impure meat, and could not afford the 
cost of meeting high standards of sanitation.88  
 
s most significant reforms, however, and perhaps the most 
enduring and valuable part of his legacy to posterity, encompass in some senses 
all of the enumerated new obligations he imputed to the federal government in 
his Autobiography. These would be the various measures he instituted on behalf 
of the burgeoning conservation movement, including the Newlands Reclamation 
Act of 1902, creation of the National Forest Service in 1905, and arguably the 
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most ambitious of all the Antiquities Act of 1906. Of these, the latter two were 
o 
him to set aside public lands for protection by executive order in the Antiquities 
Roosevelt himself expressed these principles well when he drew a rhetorical 
een the man who skins the land and the man who develops the 
89 And has there ever 
been a more vivid personification of the sort of expert, aristocratic service 
ethos other than the president himself, of course preferred by Roosevelt than 
his first chief of the Forest Service and primary lieutenant in the battle for 
conservation, Gifford Pinchot, he of (as Edmund Morris has dizzily reeled them 
France, and research spells in the ancient woodlands of Switzerland and 
gentleman, 
rich and well-connected, with a strong social conscience
boot?90    
 
would blossom dramatically after he left office in 1909, until by 1912 he was 
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advocating such an expansive purview for the federal government that the 
conservative wing of his party, then firmly in the saddle under his hand picked 
successor Taft, essentially disowned him. This process began shortly after 
Roosevelt left office, when he stumbled upon a new book Justice Learned Hand 
had mailed him while on safari in Africa. This book, Roosevelt soon declared 
illuminating study of our national conditions which has appeared for many 
91 Not surprisingly, soon after his return to America, Roosevelt invited the 
author, Herbert Croly, to Oyster Bay to lunch so they might further discuss this 
book, entitled The Promise of American Life.  
 Croly, like Roosevelt a Harvard-educated New Yorker with a strong social 
conscience but totally unlike him in that he was raised in a strikingly unorthodox 
and bohemian household and was almost neurotically shy, articulated a vision of 
government rather in line with what Roosevelt had pursued as president with his 
Square Deal. He castigated the Jeffersonian influence in the progressive 
movement (which Roosevelt also deplored), such as the restoration of free 
competition through antitrust laws and direct democracy via referendums, 
primaries and intiatives as so 
Hamiltonian conception of reform.92 Like Roosevelt, Croly felt that, while some 
large corporations had been undeniably guilty of misconduct, they in the main 
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important step in the direction of the better organization of industry and 
civilized societies to substitute cooperation for competitive methods, wherever 
93 For similar reasons, Croly suggested the 
encouragement of organized labor, although he stressed that in practice the 
unions would most likely have just as corrupting an influence on politics as the 
large corporations. 
 
as little of possible of their seemingly inevitable evil shadows of corruption and 
monopoly then? Er
would regulate corporations, unions, small businesses, and agriculture in the 
nation of yesterday and to-
94 Touching as it did 
all the well-worn Rooseveltian chords of organization, national mission, sound 
moralism, and overweening power wielded by a virtuous cadre of the best and 
brightest, the book seemed almost tailor-made for the Colonel. And, with 
R
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from which he might unravel both problems at once.  
 At Osawatomie, Kansas, in August 1910, Roosevelt aired his refurbished 
merely to that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I 
stand for having the those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial 
are the result of an imperative economic law which cannot be repealed by 
prevent such combinations, but in completely controlling them in the interest of 
95 
 Immediately the progressive wing of the GOP, which had been 
cynosure around which a Republican reform movement might form. And form it 
certainly did, so that by the time of the 1912 Republican National Convention 
Roosevelt had not only decided to lead an insurgent campaign against his old 
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friend and former lieutenant Taft, he had decisively beaten him in most of the 
d 
stonewalled him and his supporters at the Convention in Chicago by allocating 
most of the delegates from the thirty-six states they still controlled to Taft, a 
defiant Roosevelt led most of his followers across town to form their own 
Progressive Party. And, although the Progressive platform contained several 
Roosevelt largely premised his appeal to the voters around his New Nationalism 
proposals. Had the Democrats nominated a conservative, Roosevelt might have 
eked out a victory just by virtue of being the only progressive in the race. Instead 
they nominated a progressive, and one who was soon to develop a policy for 
reform of his own which Roosevelt would have to compete with and rebuff all 
across the country. 
 69 
SYNTHESIS: 
THE WILSONIAN CONSUMMATION 
 
Although he would never enjoy the same kind of broad personal popularity 
or loyal following of either Bryan or Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson would in the long 
run turn out to be arguably a more impactful and transformational figure than 
presidency could be intelligently viewed as both the apex of the progressive 
movement whether in the forms of the New Freedom, the mobilization efforts 
upon entering the First World War, or, even, in a sense, the war itself as well as 
the ultimate terminus of it, culminating as it did with an epochal diplomatic failure, 
a harsh turn towards reaction at home in the form of the Red Scare, and, finally, 
the landslide election of the most consistently conservative ticket either of the 
major parties had put forward in a generation. The reason for this overweening 
he was, after 
all, the only progressive to be twice elected to the presidency, a goal which even 
the highly popular and ultra-ambitious T.R. never matched but in the 
absorptive, heterodox nature of the reforms he would pursue while in office. 
Simply put, while Wil
in 1912 were fairly original, as a reformer in practice he engrossed signal 
elements from both the bottom-up Bryanite/populist and top-down 
Rooseveltian/New Nationalist paradigms of progressivism into a coherent 
program of his own during his first administration. This attracted just enough 
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himself a second. While he would later come to considerable grief when his 
reach exceeded his grasp and he tried to lead this ragtag reformist army on a 
in his first term Wilson managed to effect a deft synthesis of two hitherto 
seemingly incompatible notions of progressive change. 
 Despite his centrality to the progressive movement, it is actually 
something of a wonder that Wilson chose to ever become a progressive at all. 
Wilson was raised with the small-government and conservative shibboleths of 
Jefferson 
throughout his life, with the former having a significant influence upon his initial 
conception of the New Freedom, and the latter imbuing him with a strong 
conviction of the necessity of White Supremacy. His conservatism, at least until 
he hit about fifty years of age or so, went considerably deeper than this, however, 
-Goo 
government and making it more 
in line with the supposedly more genteel British political tradition of his heroes 
like Bagehot, Burke, and Gladstone in lieu of pursuing more substantial social 
and economic reforms. Eric F. Goldman has painted a memorable portrait of the 
young, stand-pat Wilson and his attitudes, and it is striking how thoroughly of an 
anti-
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to knock Mr. Bryan once for all into a cocked hat 96 Moreover, 
they had discovered in him just the man to do said knocking, with George 
Harvey the powerful editor of the staunchly conservative 
even attempting to set a Wilson-for-president bandwagon into motion throughout 
1906 and 1907.  
 Unfortunately for Harvey and the rest of the right wing of the Democratic 
Party, Wilson was in the process of undergoing a profound ideological volte-face 
during this period. Goldman has wryly summarized this change as the deeply 
f a few years, the Devil became 
97 In what was to become an increasingly characteristic pattern 
throughout his life, Wilson seems to have definitively settled on the diabolical 
nature of conservatism after he was forced to grapple tenaciously with it in what 
he considered to be great contests of moral principles that arose while he was 
president of Princeton. This was his attempt, first countenanced in 1906 to 
equivalent to fraternities. Wilson for all of his conservatism an instinctive 
democrat
democratic spirit of the place and the growth and multiplication of social 
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98 In its place, Wilson sought a more academically rigorous (and 
students and faculty would eat and study together. But a contingent of the more 
ofessor Andrew Fleming 
West, rebelled and allied themselves with the overwhelmingly stand-pat alumni 
1907. Wilson found himself caught in a similar imbroglio a few years later (again 
primarily against West) over whether to further integrate the undergraduate with 
fo
99 Wilson grew so frustrated that he 
abandoned Princeton and, incidentally, what remained of his conservatism for 
a political career in 1910, sniff
100 
 Over the years, it has become something of a commonplace to parse 
Princeton as foreshadowing his later failures to secure 
passage of the Versailles Treaty through the Senate. Certainly the dogmatic way 
he attempted to bend the trustees, faculty, and alumni to his will is apt to put one 
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in mind of his refusal to compromise with Henry Cabot Lodge and the other 
stand-
administration at Princeton mirrors the parliamentary approach he would go on to 
vocabulary, be profitably applied to the way Wilson successfully ministered 
reform bill after reform bill through Congress in his first administration:  
He [Wilson] needed not just the approval but the continuing cooperation of  
the alumni his constituents (i.e. the general voting public); the faculty
his Commons (or House of Representatives); and the trustees his Lords 
(i.e. the Senate), and in this case his masters.101  
 
establishment of h -handed collegial leadership 
102 
Moreover, this approach is also essentially the same one he would use to pass 
comprehensive reform programs as Governor of New Jersey and eventually 
president of the United States. 
 If this is the case, then is there not something rather paradoxical about 
Wilson as a leader, to say nothing of his personal character? Dogmatic to the 
point of being pugnacious, he nevertheless most excelled when he guided 
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legislation toward its goal with a gentle hand. He was blessed with a formidable 
knowledge when it came to matters of government and legislating in fact 
earning a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins in political science and yet was most 
effective at shepherding through policies largely devised by others. Unshakably 
committed to his own ideas and principles and tending to see those of others as 
not only in error but almost morally wrong, he nevertheless opportunistically 
adopted large porti
program with nary a second thought when it proved convenient. Moreover, in 
addition to pursuing several policies in a Bryanite mold, Wilson even inducted the 
Great Commoner himself into his own Cab
the experience of power and responsibility and his own self-
tempered many of his temperamental excesses, at least for awhile, and even 
imparted to him a certain degree of wise restraint.103 But above all it was his 
catholicity and willingness to learn and take freely from others as a reform leader, 
including even his former rivals, which made his first administration, and 
particularly its especially legislatively crowded first half, indubitably what 
104 
 Such a development seems especially ironic when Wilson as a president 
is juxtaposed with Wilson as a candidate. While William Allen White may have 
waggishly likened the ideological and programmatic gulf between the New 
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Nationalism and the New Freedom to the chasm separating Tweedledum from 
Tweedledee, Wilson passionately believed otherwise. He agreed wholeheartedly 
with his chief economic advisor Louis Brandeis in the contention that the 
-
Wilson it constituted noth
and industrial absolutism, tempered by governmental (that is, party) 
105 -down 
paternalism, Wilson sought ways to re-empower, rather than merely protect, the 
individual actor and the small business against encroaching corporatism. 
classically liberal elixir of restored economic competition. His rhetoric therefore 
sometimes sounded in practice, as Louis Hartz has drolly noted, as beholden to 
106 For example, he once declared  
not the man who ha
107 Indeed, at times on the campaign trail Wilson could sound 
almost like a reincarnation of Cleveland-style conservatism (which had in fact 
attracted him much in his youth), such as when he grandiloquently insisted that 
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platform was still far from conservative. Its ultimate goal, like the New 
Nationalism, and even in some senses the populist movement, was to bring the 
largest corporations under greater public control. The key difference was that 
while the Bull-Moosers wanted to regulate the trusts using a larger government, 
Wilson and his followers sought instead to undermine and perhaps destroy the 
trusts altogether by using the government to facilitate more effective competition 
from below. In some senses, therefore, the New Freedom could be construed as 
a more radical program than the New Nationalism, in that it bade fair to upend 
decade or two before they m
-
 
When we undertake the strategy which is going to be necessary to   
overcome and destroy this far-reaching system of monopoly, we are  
rescuing the business of this country, we are not injuring it; and when we  
separate the interests from each other and dismember these communities  
  
renewed from the top but that every society is renewed from the bottom    
(emphasis mine).109  
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While Hartz has sardonically defined the reasoning behind this specific species 
dynamo rising to the top after trusts were shattered but a frantic political 
still be no denying that Wilson had found a way to turn the 
110 
 
qualitative programmatic and rhetorical distinction separating Wilson from 
Roosevelt (and even to a significant extent Bryan as well), both during the 
campaign of 1912 and afterwards. Whereas Bryan and the populists had sought 
 
Roosevelt and his supporters were attempting to fashion a certain modicum of 
desire to find means of individual empowerment within (if not against) the new 
corporate order. Doubtless his lifelong admiration for the British classical liberal 
tradition of Burke, Cobden, Bright, and above all Gladstone had much to do with 
this, as did his abiding reverence for Jeffersonian ideals. The primary source, 
istent emphasis upon the individual actor was his chief 
domestic advisor of the campaign, Louis Brandeis. Brandeis, like Wilson a 
staunchly Jeffersonian Southerner, unequivocally saw the new trend toward 
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increasing bigness in business as nothing less than a curse, commenting sourly 
real corporation, men hire 
111 At a famous meeting at Sea Girt in August 1912, 
Brandeis tried to impress his conviction upon Wilson that  
competition can be and should be maintained in every branch of private   
industry; that competition can be and should be restored in those 
branches of industry in which it has been suppressed by the trusts;  and 
that, if at any future time monopoly should appear to be desirable in any 
branch of industry, the monopoly should be a public one a monopoly 
owned by the people and not by the capitalists  (emphasis mine).112   
   
This last clause enumerated by Brandeis feels especially prescient, if not 
downright clairvoyant, when considered in the light of the economic mobilizations 
Wilson undertook after leading the nation into the World War five years later. 
 
and self- ]urs is a program of liberty; theirs 
its entirety.113 He unreservedly praised the planks in the Progressive platform 
that promised greater aid to labor and to widen the ambit of social justice, for 
example. And, like Roosevelt and contra Brandeis, he tried often to make it clear 
that his animus was not for bigness in business as such, at one point even 
 and I 
114 More importantly, Wilson struggled to protect his left 
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laissez-faire 
doctrine of English political economists three- 115 This 
Cobden, Bright, and Bagehot. Perhaps sensitive to the political stereotypes 
associated with men of his regional background, Wilson tried to put some 
rhetorical distance between himself and the small-government, state-rights 
 this necessarily 
c 116 
 To a large extent the arguments Wilson made on his own behalf and 
against the Bull-Moosers were probably only of ancillary significance in clinching 
his electoral victory. The fact that he was the sole candidate leading a well-
established and united party in 1912 was far more significant in determining his 
success. Moreover, the schism in the GOP that put Wilson into the White House 
also paid serious dividends for the Democracy down ballot, helping it to win 
control of both houses of Congress for the first time in twenty years. With a 
Democratic majority of seventy-six in the House of Representatives and six in the 
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Senate (and with a new rump contingent of nine Progressives in the House, and 
one in the Senate, who, if nothing else, could be counted on to be at least 
amenable to reform legislation) Wilson was uniquely blessed to ascend to office 
alongside an especially accommodating Congress. The president-elect therefore 
now had an almost ideal opportunity to exercise precisely the sort of 
parliamentary leadership he had been advocating for his office-to-be not to 
mention admiring in British statesmen such as Gladstone for years, and one of 
which he would take ample advantage, passing not only most of his own agenda, 
 
 No matter how heated the campaign rhetoric got, and it got very hot 
indeed at least until Roosevelt was wounded in October in a botched 
assassination attempt it is striking how Wilson always kept the door at least 
While the primary motivation for this at the time was doubtless as a calculated 
political move to woo a few pr
column, it may have also in the long run turned out to betoken a desire, and 
them he did, whether as part and parcel of the broader raft of domestic reforms 
of his first administration or the economic mobilization policies of his second. 
bitterly condemning him to a British correspondent in 1916 for being 
and cold-
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of his former supporters demurred from their chief to help Wilson narrowly win a 
second term for himself in 1916.117 In fact, the effective disbandment of what 
remained of the Bull Moose Party that year probably has much to do with 
-optation of several of the most significant items in their 
agenda of 1912. This rendered another third party ticket from them almost 
redundant, which doubtless is par
of his political handiwork in 1916 and subsequent return to the Republican fold. 
 For example, when the new administration put its hand to antitrust 
legislation in 1914, it wound up with measures with strongly New Nationalist 
elements. Typically, while on the campaign trail Wilson had denounced 
big business, explaining that  
[a]s to the monopolies, which Mr. Roosevelt proposes to legalize and to  
welcome, I know that they are so many cars of juggernaut, and I do not  
look forward with pleasure to the time when the juggernauts are licensed  
and driven by commissioners of the United States.118  
 
Once in office, however, Wilson proceeded to create just such a comprehensive 
trade commission with plenary authority to supervise business practices himself 
in the form of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Ironically, Wilson took up 
the idea for the FTC largely at the behest of Brandeis, who, like the president, 
had evidently warmed considerably to the principle of regulation since luncheon 
at Sea Girt, and who even co-drafted the original bill that served as the embryo 
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for the Federal Trade Commission Act. And, indeed, the legislation did bear an 
unmistakable personal stamp from Brandeis in that the primary executive 
 
 The other major antitrust measure promulgated by Wilson, the Clayton 
Antitrust Act, was largely oriented around his New Freedom formula of 
e 
administration deemed to be unfair trade practices, specifically interlocking 
stockholdings and directorates. The measure also contained several provisions 
in a distinctly New Nationalist mold, especially in regard to labor issues. As 
passed, the act contained an amendment explicitly stating that labor unions 
furthermore prohibited the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against any 
latter of these, a plank off of the old Bull Moose platform of 1912, won Wilson 
especially fulsome gratitude from labor leaders with longtime president of the 
American Federation of Labor Samuel Gompers even going so far as to 
119 The Act as originally 
drafted contained an even more Rooseveltian clause, once again ironically 
promulgated largely at the instance of Brandeis. This proposal, co-drafted by 
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Brandeis with future Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn, which would have, in 
the spirit of the Hepburn Act of 1906, empowered the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to supervise the issuance of new securities by the railroads, failed to 
make it into the final legislation as passed. Yet it does illustrate well how 
amenable the New Freedom had become in practice to a significant infusion of 
top-down, Square Deal-style reform. 
Wilson would go on to consummate several more of the most significant 
labor-related planks in the New Nationalist platform during the second great 
as it were, of January to September 1916. The Adamson Act, while originally 
passed in order to defuse a threatened strike, did parti
call for an eight-hour workday by stipulating as much for interstate railroad 
workers, and doubtless even more in line with their affinities establishing a 
commission to study the problem further. The Kern-McGillicuddy Act created a 
federal government, which, some hoped, might go on to serve as a model for the 
Keating-Owen Act, banned the sale of any manufactured article produced using 
child labor across interstate lines. Wilson personally intervened on behalf of this 
last, sternly insisting that it was an acid-test of party loyalty to the cadre of 
Southern senators who threatened its passage. Later he confessed to have 
 84 
120 Unfortunately for Wilson and the progressives 
who had fought so long and hard for this milestone (not to mention the millions of 
poor children on whose behalf they fought), however, the Supreme Court 
declared the law unconstitutional two years later. 
 The remarkable thing about the New Freedom, however, was that it not 
only managed to incorporate aspects of the noblesse oblige, top-down, or as 
 conception of progressivism articulated by 
Roosevelt. But it also included elements of the older, more populistic movement 
of reform associated with Bryan. It is easy to forget that, in winning the 
presidency in 1912 Wilson was not only at a stroke displacing Roosevelt as the 
de facto central figure and prime representative of the progressive movement 
nationwide, but also Bryan as the default leader of the progressive wing of the 
Democratic Party. Despite his thrice leading the Democracy to defeat, Bryan 
remained a major if not preponderating force within the party. He in fact largely 
drafted the platform including planks calling, like the Bull Moosers in Chicago, 
for greater regulation of big business and constitutional amendments for the 
direct election of senators and the establishment of an income tax which was 
eventually adopted at the Democratic National Convention in 1912. Wilson might 
very well have lost the Democratic nomination in 1912 to Speaker of the House 
Champ Clark had not Bryan intervened to break the deadlock in his favor. While 
his reasons for doing so remain obscure James Chace, for example, has 
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misfired it seems clear that the Commoner was at least partially motivated by a 
conviction of his greater ideological affinity to Wilson than to the relatively stand-
pat Clark. Shortly after wrapping up the nomination, Wilson received a wire from 
a Western delegation leader who offered a marvelously perceptive analysis of 
both what united and what differentiated him from the Commoner:  
The switch of progressive leadership from Bryan to Wilson means that the  
progressive movement is passing from emotionalism to   
121  
 
reforms reflect some of the insurgent sense of collective empowerment which 
fired him and the populist elements he led, one cannot help but to conclude that 
reflected most obviously in Wilson bringing Bryan into his government as 
Secretary of State (where, he enjoyed the altogether fitting privilege of officially 
declaring the   adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment guaranteeing the direct 
election of Senators in 1913), but was also strongly evident in the measures 
passed by Wilson to bring aid and relief to the farmers. The Smith-Lever Act of 
1914, for example, bade fair to allay the endemic isolation, ignorance and 
uncertainty of farm life that so vexed the Populists, through a new network of 
cooperative extension services. These would be administered by the land-grant 
colleges and would teach farmers how to apply the latest business and scientific 
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methods to their farming. A raft of new agricultural regulations, including the 
Grain Standards, Cotton Futures, Land Bank, and Warehouse acts sought to 
inject a modicum of order and consistency into agricultural markets and credits.  
most importantl, the administration sought to ameliorate the endemic dearness of 
Subtreasury Plan and caused the hunger for cheap money at the back of the 
silver panacea with the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916. Indeed, later historians 
like John D. Hicks and Richard Hofstadter would later describe the measure as 
being in some senses an enactment of old populist ideas. According to the latter, 
when considered in concert with the Warehouse Act, this measure, which 
created a network of twelve federal farm banks to supply agricultural credits to 
122 
 The two most significant reforms of the New Freedom, however, cannot 
necessarily be neatly placed into rhetorical boxes of Bryanite insurgent populism 
or Rooseveltian noblesse oblige paternalism, but instead either furnish within 
themselves a synthesis of the two approaches or transcend the distinction 
between them altogether. The Revenue Act of 1913 corresponds to the latter, 
seeing as how the tariff had been calumniated for years by reformers all across 
nificant downward revision of tariff schedules would 
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almost certainly be at least attempted.123 The adoption of a federal income tax
the chief programmatic innovation introduced by the Act had been advocated 
consistently since the 1890s by both Bryan and the Populists (who made it a 
There was a real consensus among virtually all shades of progressive opinion as 
to the necessity of the essential provisions of the legislation, with much of the 
haggling in Congress arising in the form of rather predictable horse-trading as to 
which goods might be put on or taken off the free list. The only real ideational 
conflict that arose on the way to passage was between the administration, who 
favored a relatively modest taxation rate intended primarily to replace lost 
revenue from the tariff and interestingly enough an unlikely alliance in Congress 
Rooseveltian Republicans, who clamored for more steeply graduated and 
124 
 The passage of the Federal Reserve Act, on the other hand, serves as an 
that it is a single reform measure containing sundry qualities of the Bryanite and 
Rooseveltian conceptions of progressivism patiently stitched together into a 
workable proposal by his own light-
steerage of the legislation to its goal even more impressive is that, as John M. 
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Cooper has explained, two major points of contention soon arose as to the 
potential character of the new central banking system:  
One was whether the reserve system should be centralized or  
decentralized; the other was whether the system should operate as a  
government agency or as a private institution under some degree of 
government supervision.125  
 
Complicating matters further, as Cooper goes on to explain, was the fact that 
each of the ideological wings of both major parties tended to cluster around one 
of the four poles created by this crosscutting of policies: Conservative Democrats 
decentralized institution; the more Bryanite o
other progressives, presumably former Bull Moosers or Rooseveltian 
Republicans, desired a centralized and public banking agency; while 
conservative Republicans would have liked a centralized and privately-run 
European-style central bank.  They wanted one centered around the New York 
Stock Exchange on Wall Street. After giving the four sides a chance to assert 
themselves both at the level of ar
bill so that it squared the circle between them as much as possible. The new 
system was now a mélange of decentralized power in the form of the system of 
regional reserve banks and centralized supervision from the permanent Federal 
Reserve Board in the capital. Moreover, the system was now to be governed by 
elements of both public and private power in that the private member banks 
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could name some of the directors of the regional reserve banks and hold their 
deposits in them. Still, the president retained the right to name all central board 
members and the balance of the regional directors. Even the centralized privately 
owned model for the Fed, which would seem to be the only party not significantly 
heeded by the president (perhaps because he himself was neither a conservative 
nor a Republican), would in the fullness of time, find many of their desires largely 
accommodated by the way the new system functioned in practice. The New York 
reserve bank in the shadow of Wall Street soon assumed a dominant position 
over all the other regional units. 
 Although the revised bill had something to please most everyone, it 
inhered around a fragile balance that could not hold together under much 
Congressional meddling. Wilson himself unwittingly revealed as much in his 
address urging Congress to pass it, describing it in terms which were sometimes 
confusing if not contradictory, such as when he claimed that control of the 
t be vested in the 
Government itself, so that the banks may be the instruments, not the masters of 
126 Interestingly, in passages 
such as these, it almost sounds as if the Wilson and Roosevelt of 1912 are both 
attempting to express themselves at the same time and practically through the 
same utterance, a telling indication of how thoroughly Wilson had synthesized 
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factions of opinion to alter the bill to better suit their own preferences, Wilson 
remained patient yet firm in his resistance. At one point he shrewdly dispatched 
his Secretary of State to help bring some of his more obstreperous followers into 
line. When the act was finally passed, Wilson had achieved a reform that was an 
unalloyed triumph in Bryanite terms. It sought to make credit more available 
throughout all regions of the country, especially the credit-starved West and 
South. It was also a success in Rooseveltian terms in that it introduced a new 
possibly prevent and contain the damage of future panics. And finally the 
measure was a crowning achievement in his own terms in that it promised to 
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EPILOGUE: 
THE WAR AND THE BREAKDOWN OF PROGRESSIVISM 
 
When the long-anticipated general war finally erupted in Europe in the 
summer of 1914, the reform momentum of the New Freedom was just coming to 
a crest. Indeed, Eric F. Goldman has even gone so far as to describe the years 
period of the progressive era. Therefore, the coming of the war came as a 
surprise to many progressives, for in their excitement they had assumed that the 
world in general must also be going their way. As William Allen White remarked 
the fruits of our civilization, to a wider participation in the blessings of modern 
almost world- 128 The war in Europe came as a rude shock to this kind of 
whiggish triumphalism, and progressives, along with the rest of the country, 
would spend the next two and half years vigorously debating amongst 
as in reform politics Bryan and Roosevelt would each come to articulate a starkly 
different response to the conflict raging in Europe, which they strongly urged on 
the American people and both from within his administration and in opposition 
to it the president, who again tried to pursue a middle course between them. 
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that 129 And 
to that end, the months following the outbreak of hostilities found him using every 
country at peace. Among other things, Bryan tried to prohibit foreign loans to 
belligerent governments, pushed Wilson to offer arbitration treaties to all the 
nations in the war, sent out a feeler offering a peace mediated by the United 
States to the German ambassador Count Johann von Bernstorff, and even 
staged a photo-op in which he ostentatiously accepted a huge peace petition 
signed by 350,000 children from around the country on the steps of the State 
Department building, all to little or no avail. Finally, when the President tasked 
him to send a stern note admonishing Germany for its sinking of the Lusitania 
and the resulting deaths of 128 Americans in May 1915, Bryan resigned in 
protest from the Cabinet, lest his actions contribute toward what he saw as the 
adminis
refrained from publicly attacking his former chief once out of office, Bryan 
e. preparedness) program he feared might 
inexorably draw America into it, once even engaging in a newspaper debate with 
noted preparedness advocate William Howard Taft. 
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 And yet it might have been more fitting had Bryan debated the 
real leader and paramount spokesman, Theodore 
Roosevelt. Roosevelt had long taken an expansive view of international affairs, 
(and consequently its role) in the world, whether through armed interventions in 
Latin American under his famous Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the building 
of the Panama Canal, the intervention to mediate an end to the Russo-Japanese 
through 
the worldwide tour of the Great White Fleet. These convictions, coupled with his 
lifelong attraction toward anything martial, motivated Roosevelt to advocate a 
substantial military buildup and a greater participation in international affairs. At 
on
the world which do possess force, actual or immediately potential, should 
combine by solemn agreement in a World League for the Peace of 
 
as if, drawing upon a metaphor from his cattle-wrangling days out on the frontier, 
130 
war, and even erecting an international body roughly analogous to what 
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Roosevelt described, Roosevelt and his like-minded friend Henry Cabot Lodge 
to defeat the Treat
of Nations.131 
 
should be, the New York World published a cartoon by Rollin Kirby entitled 
vis-à-vis Bryan and 
Roosevelt beautifully. The cartoon depicts Wilson, looking burdened yet stern, 
flanked on either side by caricatures of Bryan and Roosevelt who hold out 
initialed handbills for the president to take. Bryan, with a hang-dog, weepy 
expression and crowned by an ersatz halo made of wire, holds forward a bill 
mid-yell, is meanwhile absurdly kitted out in his old khaki Rough Rider uniform 
a
132 Throughout his first administration, Wilson would 
militancy, at first following his Secretary of State in declaring the United States 
strictly neutral, but gradually coming to accept a need for some measure of 
preparedness before the war and permanent international engagement after it. 
By the beginning of his second term, however, Wilson concluded that this 
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balancing act of keeping American interests safe and at peace had become 
unsustainable, and that consequently it was time to intervene on the side of the 
Allies. 
 One of the factors that restrained the president from this momentous step 
for so long was his awareness that wars have historically been typically fatal to 
reform movements. As he prophetically explained to the journalist Frank Cobb, 
ill 
enter into the very fibre of our national life, infecting Congress, the courts, the 
that the economic measures necessary to mobilize for the war effort would fatally 
undermine the anti-monopolistic thrust of his New Freedom reforms, remarking to 
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels just as he was making up his mind to 
 
I will live to see the d 133 And, in 
waging the war effort the Wilson administration very soon did in fact come to rely 
upon the very creeping corporatism it had once treated as its avowed bête noire. 
This compromise would have dramatic and enduring consequences, for, as 
in America would be in large measure an affair conducted of, by, and for special-
interest groups of that [corporate] type, to the frequent neglect of the 
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134 
Indeed, despite the potentially reactionary effects that war might engender 
on the domestic front, most progressives chose to follow the President in 1917, 
although not without some real misgivings. They largely did so because Wilson 
belligerence by painting the conflict as essentially the latest and greatest 
progressive crusade. With his Fourteen Points, his League of Nations, and most 
of all his noble, moralistic rhetoric, Wilson was once more playing the role of the 
Great Reformer; only this time, it was not Princeton, nor New Jersey, nor even 
the United States that Wilson and the other progressives sought to deliver from 
the ruthless and corrupt, but the entire world. But Europe could not have been 
less like America than in 1919. Battered by four years of unprecedented 
destruction and slaughter, shaken by the precipitate collapse of seemingly 
immortal dynasties and empires, and reeling from wrenching national sacrifices, 
the European powers distinctly lacked the luxury of idealism and had no myths of 
national innocence left to lose. All the 
postwar period, as Wilson and the other progressives would eventually learn to 
their detriment.  
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Another reason most progressives initially opted to support the war was 
would prove justified, in the short run his efforts to mobilize the American 
economy for the struggle seemed to fulfill many long-term progressive 
aspirations, particularly in the New Nationalist, top-down vein. As David M. 
Kennedy has explained,  
[e]ntire industries, even entire economic sectors, as in the case of  
agriculture, were organized and disciplined as never before, and brought  
into close and regular relations with counterpart congressional  
committees, cabinet departments, and Executive agencies.135 
   
The War Industries Board under Bernard Baruch allocated natural resources and 
coordinated massive purchases of materiel for the federal government while 
attempting to infuse an unprecedented level of what he considered to be 
economic rationality into the American economy through industrial combination, 
standardization and the spread of mass-production techniques. The railway 
system was nationalized from 1917 to 1920 under the aegis of the newly created 
United States Railroad Administration directed by Secretary of the Treasury (and 
-in-law) William Gibbs McAdoo, thus briefly realizing an old Populist 
 the war effort was a windfall for 
organized labor, with government-sponsored organizing drives which ballooned 
union membership nationwide by more than fifty percent to over four and a half 
million by the Armistice. 
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 The impetus of war collectivism had carried progressive state building far 
beyond the wildest dreams of even Herbert Croly and the New Nationalists, 
which raised dauntingly high expectations for reforms to be pursued after the war 
was won.  A few progressives like Vernon Louis Parrington and Randolph 
Bourne may have fretted about the how the newfound empowerment of the state 
portended regulatory capture or a dangerous, unthinking mob mentality, but 
these were minority voices little heeded at the time. Frank Walsh, who as co-
chairman of the National War Labor Board with William Howard Taft had a front-
row seat for the social reforms engendered by the war effort, doubtless spoke for 
by far the greater portion of progressive sentiment when he diagnosed the mood 
of the country around the time of the 
reconstruction conferences and plans, projected by every group imaginable, 
136 Among those offering up 
plans for postwar reconstruction were Theodore Roosevelt, increasingly 
confident that he would win the Republican presidential nomination and desirous 
of an early start in putting together a platform for himself, and William Jennings 
Bryan, who published a comprehensive reconstruction program of his own in his 
periodical, The Commoner. And, while the president himself was too busy with 
the diplomatic settlement in Versailles to devote much attention to domestic 
affairs in the months following the Armistice, several figures in his administration, 
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including McAdoo, head of the Federal Fuel Administration (which controlled the 
controls into peacetime and a new round of sweeping social legislation, including 
among other things, old-age pensions, government housing, a national health 
insurance program, minimum wage and maximum hours laws, and even federal 
137 In other words, Louis 
adolescence, torn between old taboos and new reality, forever on the verge of 
again.138 
But first, a just and lasting peace for world would have to be won, and to 
that purpose the president sailed to Versailles to negotiate with the two major 
war just concluded), Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain and 
Premier Georges Clemenceau of France. And so, as in domestic politics back 
home, Wilson found himself once more part of an awkward three-legged stool. 
As with Roosevelt and Bryan, his major opponents were not ideological 
opposites but rather parallels. While the dry, idealistic Southerner, the wily, 
somewhat sybaritic Welshman, and the grizzled old Radical might seem like the 
most disparate trio imaginable at first glance, in ideological terms Wilson, Lloyd 
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George, and Clemenceau were actually cut from rather similar cloth. Like Wilson, 
progressive reform in their countries before, during, and after the war.  
As Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Liberal government before the war, 
Lloyd George had alongside Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and President of the 
Board of Trade Winston Churchill instituted a bold program of domestic reforms 
s to Britain what the 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson administrations, rolled into one, were 
139 Lloyd George was the predominant 
personality behind such epochal reforms as public exchanges for employment, 
the institution of a minimum wage, pensions for the aged, a social insurance 
system, and free school meals and medical care for the children of the poor. 
1909 the first British national budget oriented around progressive schedules of 
income and land taxation which precipitated the constitutional crisis leading to 
the effective political emasculation of the House of Lords. With all this in mind, 
ectionate popular nickname of 
as significant as León Bourgeois in implementing social reforms in France, also 
had an impressive resume of progressive bona fides going into Versailles, 
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including his tireless efforts to secularize French schools, and his longstanding 
support for the rights of trade unions. 
Perhaps it was precisely because of their shared progressivism that 
Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson failed to reach a satisfactory accord at 
Versailles. Because they had justified the sacrifices their respective publics had 
made as part and parcel of a larger moral crusade for Wilson, to make the 
Clemenceau, to, bluntly, emasculate and bleed Germany white for vengeance
none of them could safely return home with half-measures. When they did, 
inevitably the progressives in all countries lost all faith in them, and through them, 
progressivism itself at a practical level. Although every country entered the 
Versailles Conference desiring different, even directly contrary outcomes, 
 
Nor did progressive heartbreak end overseas, as the resumption of 
domestic reform each man promised upon the end of the war also turned out to 
largely muffled and watered down, (ironically by the very same conservative 
after the war seem bitterly ironic in the wake of the Red Scare.140 And at these 
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words we confront one of the profoundest ironies of the postwar: that the tide of 
reaction that drowned the progressive movement around the world in 1919 and 
1920 did not just arise in opposition to its supposed failures from the right, but 
was largely initiated and enabled by progressive leaders themselves. After the 
war, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau supported harsh repression of 
radicalism at home and overseas, with all three men authorizing military 
expeditions to undermine the fledgling Soviet Union and Clemenceau even 
Bolshevism, and all three men presiding over red scares of various dimensions in 
their respective countries.  
Indeed, it is difficult not to ag
General A. Mitchell] Palmer slew it in America; and, in each case, Woodrow 
141 
he claimed he would need to be to Frank Cobb, and much of that brutality and 
ruthlessness was directed towards dissidents both during and after the war. A 
raft of legislation passed during the war curtailing free speech and civil liberties, 
including the Espionage and Trading-with-the-Enemy Acts of 1917 and the 
Sedition Act of 1918, empowered the president to punish those who willfully 
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opinions regarding the American government, flag or uniform.142 In practice of 
course, almost anyone who deviated very far from the political mainstream could 
run afoul of such amorphous standards, and among the radicals caught in its 
dragnet were Eugene Debs, Emma Goldman, and the Industrial Workers of the 
World. Things only got worse after the war, as fear of radical infiltration from 
abroad and unprecedentedly widespread and damaging strikes (and a bomb 
exploding on his own front porch) convinced Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
to conduct a series of raids against anarchists and socialists (both real and 
suspected) in late 1919 and early 1920. And although Wilson was by this point 
largely incapacitated by a terrible stroke, he seems to have approved of the raids 
to the extent to which he was cognizant of them, at one point fearfully 
143 
In other words, while war may very well have been, as Randolph Bourne 
and, in a slower, 
more gradual way after his severe stroke in November 1919, Woodrow Wilson.144 
Indeed, it is difficult not to see the shattered, deathly wraith painfully finishing out 
the remainder of his term in the White House as a pathetic personification of all 
the once-bright hopes and plans of the progressive movement laid low. If Wilson, 
more than any other individual, was responsible for giving those visions a 
tangible form than he was also certainly most to blame for bringing them, along 
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with himself, so utterly to wreck. He had once boldly sought a New Freedom for 
America, and eventually even the world, but after it failed to take and America 
and the world slid catastrophically into chaos and reaction in 1919 and 1920, he 
was left to languish as a sort of grotesque living ghost, wandering the ruins of his 
once unrivalled power and influence and bitterly recounting the numberless 
broken dreams of the past quarter-century. Indeed, Page Smith has memorably 
House became his asylum, a national sanatorium occupied by a tragic remnant 
145 All of the youthful vigor and roof-shaking oratory of Bryan, all 
of the robust athleticism and invigorating zest in command of Roosevelt, and all 
eventually, world, had all finally dwindled down into this pathetic invalid, the sight 
of whom reduced even some of his bitterest opponents to tears. Wilson only 
seemed to show flashes of his former fire and strength when expressing his 
 
 Indeed, by the time the next presidential election came around in 1920, all 
three of the major progressive leaders were either dead or severely diminished 
men. Bryan never quite managed to recapture his former political influence and 
following after resigning from office in 1915, and by 1920, although still only sixty 
years old, seemed like a relic from another era, embarrassingly illustrated by his 
antediluvian refusal to use (or failure to understand) the new microphones at that 
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most of his energy exploiting his fame to shill real estate in Florida and, most 
damaging of all to his historical reputation, lead the charge against the teaching 
of evolution, most famously at the infamous Scopes Monkey Trial in Dayton, 
Tennessee, where he died peacefully in his sleep in 1925. Roosevelt, his body 
ravaged and prematurely aged by years of strenuous exertion and never entirely 
recovered from a rather foolhardy sojourn down the Amazon River in 1914, had 
recapture the party and nominate the
conservative Senator, Warren G. Harding, in 1920. Wilson, despite his crippling 
physical incapacity, briefly entertained a pathetic hope that the Democrats would 
renominate him in 1920, before the Convention disabused him by also selecting 
an Ohioan, the solidly moderate Governor James M. Cox, who was partially 
chosen because he had absolutely no ties to the by-now highly unpopular 
of Nations blocked in the Senate by Henry Cabot Lodge and overwhelmingly 
rejected by the electorate in the Republican avalanche of 1920, Wilson would 
linger on a few more painful years before finally dying in 1924. 
 While the ratification of the long-fought-for Nineteenth Amendment in 
August of 1920 arguably the crowning reform of the progressive movement
was a source of enormous satisfaction for most progressives, it was almost the 
one saving grace in an election that otherwise went disastrously for them. To 
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start with, as Herbert Croly pointed out in a glumly perceptive article published 
shortly before the election in The New Republic 
major parties had bothered to field a recognizably progressive candidate. 
Instead, reform-minded voters this year were forced to choose between a 
low and, considering the 
record of his party, of more than doubtful cash value,
only dares to defy progressivism by being unmistakably reactionary, but he is 
counting on his partiality for private business and his renunciation of any 
146 Moreover, the 
electorate now seemed largely indifferent to the calls for economic and social 
reform that initially emanated from the Democratic campaign, and bored by the 
legi
the popular vote (60%) ever reliably recorded to that point. 
 While this election was such a debacle for progressives it would effectively 
kill off the progressive movement at the national level for at least a decade, it did 
produce at least one figure who showed promise as a future reform leader. This 
ry of the Navy Franklin 
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Theodore Roosevelt, whom he idolized, FDR had vital links to both of the major 
progressive presidencies and, many Democrats no doubt hoped in 1920, the 
progressive wings of both major parties. And while Roosevelt seemingly failed to 
significantly buoy what was almost certainly a doomed ticket in 1920, the flurry of 
proposals and counterproposals for reform roiling American politics as he was 
coming of age seem to have made an indelible impression on him, inspiring 
much of his own reform agenda when he was elected president in his own right a 
dozen years later. Even the name given to this agenda was a 
portmanteau word of the domestic programs of his former chief and cousin 
respectively, the New Freedom and the Square Deal.  
 Specifically, much of the First New Deal took its impetus from the top-
down, New Nationalist conception of reform favored by Theodore Roosevelt and 
Herbert Croly, especially the National Recovery Act and the original iteration of 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act in that they involved government cooperation with 
big business, the relaxation of antitrust laws, and greatly strengthened 
government control over economic planning, working conditions, and production. 
Other New Deal measures, such as the Public Utility Holding Companies Act, the 
Glass-Steagall Act and arguably the National Labor Relations Act, inhered 
around the atomistic, New Freedom conception of reform associated with 
Woodrow Wilson and Louis Brandeis, in that they all sought to disincentivize 
bigness and empower the individual as an economic actor. Even Bryan and the 
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Populists exerted a certain broad influence over the New Deal in their distrust of 
the excesses of Wall Street and their general convictions that the federal 
government ought to exert control over the money supply, defend the rights of 
workers to strike and organize, and set tax schedules according to the ability to 
pay. Indeed, well over a decade after Bryan, Roosevelt and Wilson had all died 
and almost a decade since the political movements they led had all petered out, 
the ideological push and pull between them was continuing to catalyze and 
influence the development of new and innovative public policy which, considering 
that the New Deal and its legacy remain the template for mainstream American 
liberalism, has exerted an influence lasting down to our own day. And, when one 
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